CMX Lunch Seminar

Every nondegenerate bimatrix game has a Nash equilibrium of Shapley index +1, since all equilibria are isolated, have index ±1, and their indices sum to +1. We prove that the following promise search problem is PPADS-complete: given a rational bimatrix game promised to be nondegenerate, find an exact Nash equilibrium of index +1. The nondegeneracy promise can be removed if nonregular equilibria are also accepted: finding either a regular Nash equilibrium of index +1 or a nonregular Nash equilibrium in an arbitrary rational bimatrix game is also PPADS-complete. To our knowledge, this is the first PPADS-complete equilibrium search problem whose instances are explicit rational normal form payoff matrices, rather than succinct circuits or Turing machines, and thereby addresses an open question posed by [Daskalakis2019].