Ulric B. and Evelyn L. Bray Social Sciences Seminar

Wednesday March 17, 2021 12:00 PM

Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism

Speaker: Lars Ehlers, Department of Economics, Université de Montréal
Location: Online Event

Abstract: In the context of priority-based allocation of objects, we formulate methods to compare assignments in terms of their stability. We introduce three basic properties that a reasonable stability comparison should satisfy. We show that, for any stability comparison satisfying the three properties, the top trading cycles mechanism is minimally unstable among efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms when objects have unit capacities. Our unifying approach covers basically all natural stability comparisons and establishes the robustness of a recent result by Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2020). When objects have non-unit capacities, we characterize the capacity-priority structures for which our result is preserved.

Written with Battal Doğan. Professor Ehlers will be joined by guests Thayer Morrill and Ran Shorrer.

How to view the seminar:
Sign up for a free twitch.tv account, and tune in on Wednesdays at noon pacific time on twitch.tv/caltechecontheory. You will be able to ask questions on the twitch chat.

Series Ulric B. and Evelyn L. Bray Social Sciences Seminar Series

Contact: Letty Diaz letty.diaz@caltech.edu