Computing and Mathematical Sciences Colloquium
October 10, 2016
Secure State-Estimation and Control for Dynamical Systems Under Adversarial Attacks
Professor Paulo Tabuada,
University of California at Los Angeles
Control systems work silently in the background to support much of the critical infrastructure we have grown used to. Water distribution networks, sewer networks, gas and oil networks, and the power grid are just a few examples of critical infrastructure that rely on control systems for its normal operation. These systems are becoming increasingly networked both for distributed control and sensing, as well as for remote monitoring and reconfiguration. Unfortunately, once these systems become connected to the internet they become vulnerable to attacks that, although launched in the cyber domain, have for objective the manipulation of the physical domain. In this talk I will discuss the problem of state-estimation and control for linear dynamical systems when some of the sensor measurements are subject to an adversarial attack. I will show that a separation result holds so that controlling physical systems under active adversaries can be reduced to a state-estimation problem under active adversaries. I will characterize the maximal number of attacked sensors under which state estimation is possible and propose computationally feasible estimation algorithms.
Computing and Mathematical Sciences Colloquium Series