Linde Institute/Social and Information Sciences Laboratory (SISL) Seminar

Friday November 16, 2012 12:00 PM

Average Testing and Pareto Efficiency

Speaker: Yakov Babichenko, Caltech
Location: Baxter 127

We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing strategic games: average testing. In this procedure each player sticks to her current strategy if it yields a payoff that exceeds her average payoff by at least some fixed Ɛ>0; otherwise she chooses a strategy at random. We consider generic two-person games where both players play according to the average testing procedure on blocks of k-periods. We demonstrate that for all k large enough, the pair of time-average payoffs converges (almost surely) to the 3Ɛ-Pareto efficient boundary.

Series Linde Institute/Social and Information Sciences Laboratory Seminar Series (SISL)

Contact: Victoria Mason at Ext. 3831 vmason@hss.caltech.edu